candidate, is to provide an explanation of why at least 30% of those who voted ALP at the 2007 general election did not allocate their first preference to the Greens candidate in 2009.
Australia's political party system, while remaining resiliently two-party dominant, has, since the Labor split of 1955, usually accommodated a small, electorally relevant party of the right or the left -successively: the Democratic Labor Party (DLP); the Australia Party; the Australian Democrats; the Nuclear Disarmament Party; One Nation; and now the Australian Greens. The operations of the alternative vote (AV) in the House of Representatives have determined the roles they have played in the party system. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s the DLP by its pro-Coalition preference strategy damaged the ALP's electoral prospects, even to the extent of denying it government in 1961 and 1969. Since the Greens began to emerge at a State level from a diverse collection of environmental and social movements in the 1980s, they have become electorally significant in three ways: by winning Senate places since 1990; by directing the bulk of their supporters' second preferences to the ALP in the lower house; and by becoming a serious challenge to the Labor Party in selected constituencies at both federal and State levels. It is the last of these that makes the Greens/ALP relationship unique and 'a combustible mix' (Warhurst 2007) .
While the DLP helped the Coalition and harmed the ALP, it was never able to wrest a federal seat from either of them. The Greens, on the other hand, have done so once at the Cunningham by-election in October 2002, and buoyed by its 23% vote at the 2010 Tasmanian election -albeit under single transferable vote (STR) proportional representation and the Rudd Labor government's controversial shelving of its carbon reduction policy, have emerged as Labor's main opponent in the federal seat of Melbourne, held by senior minister Lindsay Tanner, and perhaps even in Sydney and Grayndler -also held by ministers (Tomazin 2010) .
It is no coincidence that these three electorates are located in the central districts of major capital cities and are ultra safe from any Coalition assault. Here, Labor's ideological friends are its electoral enemies: according to Tanner, 'we [the ALP] are the Greens' real target, not the conservatives' (Tanner 2010 ). Tanner's surprise decision not to recontest his seat at the next federal election only enhances the Greens' chances of its first success of winning a House of Representatives seat at a general election. However, largely thanks to AV, at most general elections it is the ideological affinity rather than the electoral rivalry that is most obvious. 1 The 2009 by-election in the Victorian federal division of Higgins presents as a recent illustration of the complexity of the ideological and voting relationships between the ALP and the Australian Greens. While the study of individual Australian by-elections by political scientists has fallen into disfavour in recent times (Cunningham being an exception), probably because they are inconsistent indicators of general voting trends, some by-elections present unique opportunities to illuminate certain voting (or non-voting) patterns obscured at general elections. It is on this basis that an indicative analysis of the 2009 by-election for the Victorian federal division of Higgins is warranted. 2 It was triggered by the retirement from parliament of long-time member Peter Costello, who had held the seat since 1990, was Treasurer from 1996 to 2007, and was at one point seen as a future Prime Minister.
On the same day (5 December) another by-election was conducted in the New South Wales division of Bradfield caused by the retirement of former Liberal leader Dr Brendan Nelson; however the only significant similarity between the contests was the decision of the Australian Labor Party not to field a candidate in either -a tactic Nick Economou (1999, 239) has called 'strategic absenteeism'. The effective contests were then between the Liberal Party and the Australian Greens, but the two electorates' different social demographics make Higgins the more interesting case study, since it permits the identification of those segments of Labor's constituency that will or will not transfer allegiance to the Greens in the absence of an ALP candidate.
One of the most notable features of the Higgins campaign was the ALP decision not to stand a candidate. This was not unprecedented, with eight of the 13 by-elections held since 1996 being uncontested by the major party that did not previously hold the seat. While Labor's decision not to contest Bradfield was understandable, the reasons behind the decision to sit out Higgins were less obvious. 3 The expectations of an easy Liberal victory -as professed by the ALP and some in the media (Johnston 2009 ) -may have been based on the assumption that, like Bradfield, Higgins was an unassailably safe Liberal seat; however there were conflicting views on this point. Retiring member Peter Costello claimed on election night, perhaps disingenuously, that 'This seat is marginal. It was marginal before tonight and it will be marginal after tonight' (Gordon and Fyffe 2009) , while Liberal Party sources expected a 'line ball' result on preferences (Kerr and Rout 2009) . Conversely, Antony Green employed past electoral results to argue that while Higgins was certainly more marginal than Bradfield, a Liberal loss was highly unlikely (Green 2009 ) because of Higgins' historical resistance to broader national and state-wide swings. Yet at the 2007 general election the Liberal primary vote in Bradfield was 59.07% and the two-party preferred 63.45% contrasted to 53.61% and 57.04% in Higgins. Significantly for this analysis, Higgins is much more sociodemographically diverse than Bradfield, and contains significant clusters of loyal ALP voters in addition to wealthy suburbs such as Toorak, Malvern and Armadale.
The federal division of Higgins encompasses five State electoral districts -Prahran, Burwood, Oakleigh, Hawthorn and Malvern, of which only Malvern lies entirely within its boundaries. Malvern represents the blue-ribbon centre of Higgins and is a safe Liberal seat with a 2006 State election two-party preferred vote of 61.32%, and Hawthorn is slightly safer (62.26%). However, the 2 The Australian Greens won the Cunningham by-election for both sociological and political reasons (see Cahill and Brown 2008, 259-75) 3 Of course it is possible that Labor feared that its candidate's preferences may have been distributed leading to the election of the Greens candidate. This thesis gains credibility when one considers the antipathy that former Prime Minister Rudd held towards the Greens generally -for example, his stubborn refusal to negotiate with the Greens' senators over the Emissions Trading Scheme.
THE HIGGINS BY-ELECTION OF 2009 695 remaining three seats are held by the ALP (Burwood, 54.73%; Prahran, 53.53%; Oakleigh, 62.37%) and together constitute a significant portion of Higgins. 4 By contrast, Bradfield encompasses five safe Liberal State seats. The majority of the division contains the State electoral districts of Kuring-gai and Davidson, held with 2007 two-party preferred votes of 78.99% and 74.67% respectively, while also consisting of small parts of Hornsby (66.53%), Lane Cove (62.36%) and Willoughby (64.47%).
The Liberal candidate was Kelly O'Dwyer, a local resident and former Costello staffer who was presented as his anointed successor. Her campaign literature featured Costello's photograph rather than that of then current leader Malcolm Turnbull -fortuitously as he was replaced by Tony Abbott during the campaign. The Greens candidate was Dr Clive Hamilton, a prominent but controversial Canberra academic hand-picked by party leader Senator Bob Brown. One commentator claimed that the 'spartan' lifestyle promoted by the 'ascetic' Dr Hamilton would not appeal to the 'conspicuous consumerism' of Higgins (Kerr 2009 ). The campaign styles strongly reflected these markedly dissimilar candidates. The Greens' campaign focused on the environment and specifically the Liberal Party's opposition to emissions trading, with Hamilton labelling the by-election 'a referendum on climate change'. O'Dwyer, in a successful attempt to distance herself from the federal parliamentary Liberal leadership contest between Malcolm Turnbull and Tony Abbott and undermine Hamilton -whom she labelled a 'blow-in from Canberra' -focused heavily on local issues, and disseminated enough campaign literature to be labelled 'a one woman publishing house' (Gordon and Fyffe 2009) .
The result was a comfortable victory for the Liberal Party, securing the seat on first preference votes, with a two-candidate-preferred percentage of 60.23. For its part the Greens reached its highest ever House of Representatives first preference vote at 32.40%, however fell well short of its stated aim of taking the contest to preferences. As has become the norm in the aftermath of byelections, and despite this unambiguous result, the major contestants claimed to have performed as well or better than they had expected.
The Liberal Party's interpretation was of a resounding victory and a vote of confidence in new leader Tony Abbott and his opposition to the Rudd (Milne 2009) . By contrast, the Greens professed happiness with their performance, with federal parliamentary leader Senator Bob Brown labelling it a 'remarkable setback for the Liberals' (Grattan 2009 ). The party allegedly held relatively modest expectations (though this was expressed after the event) and considered victory highly unlikely, claiming they did not expect any more than 35% of first preference votes (Hamilton 2009 ). In considering the presentation and interpretation of results, it is important to note that turnout declined from 93.77% in 2007 to 79.02% in 2009, while informality increased from 2.57% to 4.15% of votes cast, or 2.41% to 3.28% of enrolled voters. Such a high variation in turnout from the 2007 general election needs to be factored into any analysis of the by-election outcome. Tables 2 to 4 present the first-preference and two-candidate-preferred result as a percentage a) of formal votes, b) of total votes, and c) of electors entered on the Higgins roll. These adjusted results are significant in that they reveal that in real terms the Liberal vote declined significantly, while the supposed 'proxy Labor' candidate (Hamilton) failed to harvest a significant portion of those who had voted ALP in 2007. The purpose of using the category of total enrolled voters is to take into account the very high abstention rate (24,945 abstainers from 88,149 enrollees), and the impact this should have had on subsequent assessments of the two major Higgins contestants' actual performance.
Part of the 2009 decline in both the Liberal and Greens votes can be attributed to a drop in voter participation. However, while turnout decreased to 79.02% from the 93.77% at the 2007 election and an average of 93.86% over the previous five, it was not significantly lower than would be expected , with most recent federal by-elections returning turnout figures of between 80% and 85%. Unfortunately, it is not feasible to judge turnout declines on a polling booth basis, due to the low level of variation involved, the relocation of some booths from their 2007 locations, uneven patterns of population mobility and growth, and the fact that some voters do not always vote at the same location at each election.
The assumption that the Greens could expect a strong transference of Labor's 2007 primary vote proved false; Hamilton garnered only 24.54% of enrolment out of the combined 38.22% who voted either ALP (28.39%) or Greens (9.82%) in 2007, effectively losing around half of the ALP vote. However, the Labor Party remains the major beneficiary of the second preferences of Greens voters. Analyses of previous State and federal elections in the Higgins area demonstrate a high level of preference transfer efficiency from the Greens to Labor, with a consistent 80% of Greens votes eventually flowing to the ALP. This occurred in Higgins in 2007, as well as in the overlapping State seats of Burwood, Oakleigh and most notably Prahran in 2006, where Greens' preferences helped the ALP candidate defeat his Liberal rival from an initially inferior first preference position.
Comparable figures for the State seats of Hawthorn and Malvern are unavailable as the Victorian Electoral Commission does not always publish the full distribution of preferences. Once any one candidate has achieved an outright majority share of the vote, the remaining votes are instead distributed directly to the winner and the estimated runner-up to calculate a two-candidatepreferred result. In these two electorates the Liberal candidate achieved an outright majority on first preference votes. However, the transfer efficiency of Greens preferences to the ALP in 2007 can be calculated as being between 65% and 92% in Malvern and between 62% and 74% in Hawthorn, depending on the preferences of Family First and People Power voters. As a preference distributor, the Greens are 'allies of Labor' (Manning and Rootes 2004, 406) and while preference flows suggest most Greens voters would be willing to transfer their vote to the ALP in the absence of a Greens candidate, the converse is not true. With regard to demographic characteristics, Bennett (2008, 22-4) and Turnbull and Vromen (2004) provide a snapshot of Greens voters and find that, as opposed to those who support the big parties, they are more likely to be young, hold a university degree, profess no religious affiliation and live in innermetropolitan areas. Of course, segments of Labor's newer constituency also reflect this description of Greens voters which partly explains the often robust competition between these two left-of-centre parties -for example in the federal seat of Melbourne and the inner-metropolitan State seats of Melbourne, Richmond and Brunswick. This contest resembles the sometimes vigorous electoral turf wars waged between the Liberal and National Parties, despite their avowed ideological similarities (Hughes 1985, 35-53) .
The Higgins result indicates that, in the absence of an ALP candidate, certain types of Labor voters will not vote Greens regardless of the often-asserted ideological compatibility of the two parties. Analysis of vote shares for individual polling booths reveals that at the 2007 general election the ALP vote in Higgins was strongest in two areas: the north-western extremity of the division, comprising the suburbs of Prahran, Windsor and South Yarra; and the eastern extremity, comprising the suburbs of Chadstone, Burwood, Ashburton and Hughesdale. Each of these locations is dominated by a distinct section of the modern ALP's voter base, with the postmaterialist 'new Laborites' located in the north-west, and the traditional working class/lower middle class, ethnically diverse 'old Labor' base concentrated in the east. Within these different areas in 2009 there was some variability of ALP to Greens vote conversion from 2007, but it tended to range from 60% to 85%, with lower conversion corresponding to a swing toward the Liberal Party by 2007 Labor supporters. The highest rate of vote conversion occurred in safe Liberal booths; however, this is likely due to the lack of any significant 'old Labor' support base at those booths, and a small protest vote by erstwhile Liberals.
The lowest vote conversion efficiency from Labor to the Greens occurred in two booths; Hawksburn Central in the north-west of Higgins at 44%, and Hughesdale North in the south-east at 51%. These booths recorded among the highest levels of ALP support in 2007 (Hughesdale North 47%; Hawksburn Central 41%) and represent core sections of the traditional Labor voter base. The Hawksburn Central booth was located at South Yarra Community Baptist Church, at the foot of a large complex of public housing accommodation, while the Hughesdale North booth was located at Sts Anargiri College, in the midst of a predominantly Greek community straddling Hughesdale and Oakleigh. The voters at these booths are not the postmaterialist segment of the Labor constituency of the inner-city. When offered a Greens candidate in place of a Labor one they went elsewhere, or simply did not turn out.
In addition, the DLP received by far its highest first preference vote at these two booths: Hawksburn Central (12.77%) and Hughesdale North (9.25%) contrasted to a Higgins-wide total of 3.69%. While a DLP candidate had been It is tempting to surmise that the word 'Labor' in the DLP name may have caught the eye of some voters unaware of the historical animosity between the ALP and the DLP. Unusual preference allocations give some support to this proposition, with 33% and 37% of voters at these booths who gave the DLP their first preference ignoring the party's how-to-vote card, which recommended a second preference for an Independent and then the Liberal, and directing their preferences to the Greens candidate, who was ranked third last on the DLP ticket.
Of equal interest was the pattern of informal voting. Hawksburn Central and Hughesdale North returned informal votes at a rate of 7.38% and 9.25%, against the division average of 4.15% (in 2007 overall informality was 2.57%; Hawksburn Central 4.28%; Hughesdale North 4.76%). Accidentally spoilt ballots are mostly caused by voters with lower levels of English proficiency combined with multiple candidacy (JSCEM 2007, 108-10) . However, at the Higgins by-election the pattern of informality seemed to suggest some strategic activity which produced localised spikes on the 2007 levels. Lastly, the Hawksburn Central and Hughesdale North booths returned swings to the Liberal Party of þ1.93% and þ5.63%, against a total swing of þ0.92% for Higgins as a whole. The combination of unusually high DLP, Liberal and informal votes in normally strong ALP booths suggests a reaction from traditional Labor voters who were unwilling to first preference the Greens. This assumption is also supported by the previously noted low ALP to Greens vote conversion and decline in overall voter turnout. Aspects of this trend are also evident at other booths that favoured the ALP in 2007, with large DLP vote shares at Prahran (6.33%) and Prahran East (6.14%), significant pro-Liberal swings at Alamein (7.07%) and Windsor (6.24%), and high levels of informal voting at Chadstone (5.86%) and Carnegie Upper (5.63%).
In the absence of available opinion polling at the 2009 Higgins by-election, aggregate voting data can take this analysis only so far and conclusions must be regarded as indicative. But if there is something to be confirmed from this result, it is that it is the postmaterialist 'new' Labor voters who emerge as ideological bedfellows of the Greens and who, in certain circumstances regard the environmental party as a 'proxy ALP', whereas the 'old' Labor constituency does not.
